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An Appellate Mechanism  for Review of Arbitral Decisions
In Investor - State Disputes:  Prospects and Challenges
David A. Gantz*
During the past few years there has been increasing discussion of a new “appellate body”
--or better (to avoid confusion with the WTO) an “appellate mechanism”-- for reviewing arbitral
decisions in investor - state disputes.1  While the current interest in the concept appears to have
originated in the debate leading up to and in the United States’ Trade Promotion Authority
legislation (enacted in 2002), Professor Thomas Walde indicates that the idea goes back at least
to 1991.2  The most recent concrete proposal, subsequently recanted and now in limbo, was
offered in an October 2004 ICSID Secretariat document.3
However, the appellate mechanism issue is no longer simply an academic or theoretical
one.  Once the Dominican Republic - Central American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”)4
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5 As of September 2005, CAFTA-DR had been ratified by the United States,
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and the Dominican Republic..  (See US Trade Representative
Rob Portman Statement Regarding Dominican Republic’s Passage of CAFTA-DR, Sept. 6, 2005,
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/September/US_Trade_Representat
ive_Rob_Portman_Statement_Regarding_Dominican_Republics_Passage_of_CAFTA-DR.html
(visited Sept. 7, 2005) (discussing the current state of CAFTA-DR ratification).  Costa Rica was
not expected to approve the agreement until the first quarter of 2006.  (Email from former Costa
Rican negotiator Roberto Echandi, Aug. 2, 2005; copy on file with author.)  Passage in
Nicaragua is likely to be delayed due to an internal political crisis.  See Costa Rica, Other
Countries Face Difficulties in Approving DR-CAFTA, Inside US Trade, Aug. 19, 2005, available
at http://www.insidetrade.com (visited Sept. 7, 2005).  Although a final decision had not been
made as of mid-September, political and economic considerations suggest that CAFTA-DR is
very likely to go into effect for at least five of the seven Parties as of January 1, 2006, presumably
triggering to the appellate mechanism annex.
6 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, Annex 10-F.
7 North American Free Trade Agreement, December 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993).
enters into force on January 1, 20065, an annex to CAFTA-DR requires the Parties to establish a
negotiating group for an “appellate body or similar mechanism” within three months (April 1,
2006) and to prepare a suitable amendment to CAFTA-DR within a year thereafter.6  It is thus
reasonably possible that some sort of more concrete proposal for an appellate mechanism will
evolve in the CAFTA-DR context.  Should the process in CAFTA-DR be successful, there will
undoubtedly be renewed pressure on the Parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”)7 (United States, Canada, Mexico), and to signatories to other recent U.S. bilateral
investment treaties (“BITs) and free trade agreements (“FTAs”) with investment provisions to
agree on a similar mechanism.
Actual implementation of an investment appellate mechanism for CAFTA-DR, NAFTA
or other FTAs or BITs is of course another matter entirely.  That process, requiring an
amendment to each of the agreements by each Party through its constitutional processes, could
take years, or may never reach fruition.  The controversial nature of the appellate mechanism and,
even more, the political sensitivity post CAFTA-DR of submitting any trade agreement or
amendment thereto to the U.S. Congress or other legislatures, make prompt creation of an
appellate mechanism highly problematic, even assuming that the CAFTA-DR negotiating group
actually produces a “draft amendment” in a timely manner.
In this essay I discuss  how the investment appellate mechanism concept originated;
review the current “appeal” process for investor-state arbitral decisions, with particular attention
to the three NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral decisions that have been reviewed to date; set forth the
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8 NAFTA, supra note 7, arts. 1103, 1105, 1106, 1109, 1110, respectively;
procedures for international arbitration between NAFTA nationals and the NAFTA governments
are contained in Section B.
9 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Partial Award, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Aug. 7,
2002)), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf (last visited Mar.
11, 2003).  See the pleadings, orders and other documents at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_6.htm (currently ending with the hearing transcripts
dated Jun2 3004).
10 Sunbelt Water, Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Claim and Demand for Arbitration, Oct.
12, 1999, available at http://naftaclaims.com.   The action, claiming that Canada had
discriminated against the firm in denying it the right to export water from Canada, was never
pursued.  (This proprietary website is the best single source of documentation for NAFTA,
Chapter 11 claims.)
11 Exec. Order D-5-99 of the State of California, Mar. 25, 1999, as modified by
Exec. Order D-52-02, Mar. 14, 2002, available at http://www.governor.ca.gov (visited May 1,
2003).
rationale supporting an appellate mechanism; consider what is perhaps the key legal issue,
standard  of review; and review some of the other political, procedural and legal hurdles.  I
conclude with a few comments and recommendations.
I. The Genesis of the Appellate mechanism Concept
The current impetus in the United States for an investment appellate mechanism for
investor-state dispute arbitration comes primarily from non-governmental organizations, several
domestic government agencies (EPA, Justice) and Congressional concerns regarding NAFTA
Chapter 11.  Chapter 11 contemplates the likelihood of disputes between a foreign investor or
service provider and the host government or an agency thereof.  Foreign investors may seek
arbitration under Chapter 11 of any of the obligations guaranteed under Section A of Chapter 11,
such as most favored nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment freedom from export or local
content performance requirements, the right to make most financial transfers, and restrictions
against expropriation whether direct or indirect.8   Among the concerns that NGO and
Congressional critics have raised is that “normal” regulatory actions, including but not limited to
those in the environmental/health fields, would be as compensable takings in such cases as
Methanex9 and Sunbelt Water10.   
With regard to “regulatory” takings, the focus has been on Methanex.   The Canadian firm
Methanex challenged the action of the State of California in banning the gasoline additive,
MTBE, because of the perceived risks of MTBE pollution of the underground water supply.11
Methanex manufactures methanol, which is the principal ingredient in MTBE, and argued that 
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12 Methanex Notice of Intent, available at http://www.naftaclaims.org at 3.
13 Methanex, Partial Award, supra note 9, para. 172(2).   
14 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America (Final Award), Aug. 3, 2005,
at 300, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_6.htm  (visited Aug. 11, 2005); see
State Dept. Press Release, NAFTA Tribunal Dismisses Methanex Claim, Aug. 10, 2005,
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/50964.htm (visited Sept. 7, 2005) (noting that
Methanex is required to pay the United States “more than $4 million in legal costs and arbitral
expenses).
15 See, e.g., Public Citizen, U.S. Dodging Bullet in Methanex Ruling Does not
Remedy Threats from NAFTA Chapter 11 Foreign Investment Protection Mechanism, Aug. 10,
2004, available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2017 (visited Aug. 16,
2005) (stating that “Today’s dismissal of a NAFTA “Chapter 11” challenge to California’s
phase-out of MTBE does little to ease public concerns about the extraordinary foreign investor
protection rules in NAFTA-style agreements and does nothing to alleviate the unusual and
radical threat to other local, state and federal public interest policies . . . .”).
16 See Letter to USTR Robert Zoellick from the Center for International
Environmental Law (“CIEL”) and other NGOs, Dec. 7, 2004, available at
http://www.ciel.org/Tae/CAFTA_7Dec04.html  (stating that “it is vital to emphasize at the outset
that the introduction of an appellate mechanism fails to address the significant underlying
problems with both the substantive and procedural provisions in the investment chapter of
CAFTA . . . .”)
the measures taken by California constituted a “substantial interference and taking of Methanex
US’ business and Methanex’s investment in Methanex US.  These measures were characterized
both directly and indirectly tantamount to expropriation.”12  The original tribunal did not reach
the question of whether California’s action constituted a compensable taking under Article 1110, 
dismissing the original complaint on grounds that the connection between the California MTBE
ban and Methanex’ operations was not “legally significant” so as to satisfy the “relating to”
language in NAFTA, Article 1101.13  All claims against the United States contained in a revised
claim, both jurisdictional and substantive, were also dismissed, and the United States awarded
attorneys’ fees and court costs that will likely exceed $4 million.14
The concerns raised by Methanex were ultimately unfounded.  However, NGOs and other
NAFTA critics are continuing to argue that were a future tribunal reviewing similar facts to
require compensation, it could lead to a chilling effect on national and state government
regulation in these areas.15   Some, including a majority of the Congress, as noted below, have
felt that an appellate mechanism to review investment decisions could deal with the possible
“rogue” arbitral decision, although others have argued that this would not be a panacea for the
many perceived shortcomings of Chapter 11.16   Whether members of the business/investment
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17 See Anthony F.T. Fernando, The Requirement to Provide a Bank Guaranty, In
Return for a Continuation of the Provisional Stay of Enforcement of the Award Under Article
52(5) of the ICSID Convention – Can This be Justified?, at 4 (2004) (unpublished paper on file
with author) (noting that in several ICSID arbitrations subject to multiple tribunal and
Annulment Committee review the entire arbitration process required seven and ten years).
18 Knull & Rubin, supra note 1, at 564.
19 The ICSID Secretariat reports that of the 159 cases submitted to ICSID from the
outset until mid-2004, 85 were before the Centre in one form or another during 2004, and 30 new
cases were registered during the year.  ICSID Annual Report 2004, at 3-4 (Sep. 10, 2004),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/pubs/1998ar/2004_icsid_ar_en.pdf (visited Aug. 16,
2005).
20 For a discussion of some of the jurisprudence in these areas, see David A.Gantz,
The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States - Chile Free
Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679, 708-740 (2004).
21 See Susan Franck, supra note 1, at 1565, 1559-65 (discussing the Lauder cases in
detail); Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, LCIA no. , Sept. 3, 2001, Available at
http://www.cetv-net.com/iFiles/1439-lauder-cr_eng.pdf (visited Aug. 23, 2005).
community will support the idea of an appellate mechanism remains to be seen.  Presumably, this
will turn in large part on the scope of appellate review, the likelihood that payment of an award
will not be unduly delayed by appeal, as has happened on some occasions with the ICSID
Annulment Committee Process17, the belief by some claimants that “betting the farm” high-
stakes arbitrations of very complex matters require a solid and predictable appellate process,18
and whether support for such a mechanism might head off efforts to weaken substantively the
Chapter 11 protections in subsequent bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) and in free trade
agreements (“FTAs”).   However, the objectives of the proponents for an investment appellate
mechanism are clearly broader than this; they relate to the desirability of greater consistency
among the increasing volume of ICSID, UNCITRAL and other investment tribunal decisions19
that increasingly are adopting conflicting interpretations of similar treaty provisions on “fair and
equitable treatment” or indirect expropriation.20
The most extreme example of a conflict is the so-called “Lauder” cases, involving a
dispute between a U.S. investor and the Czech Government.  One action was brought by Ronald
S. Lauder under the United States - Czech BIT in London, while the other was brought in
Stockholm by CME Czech Republic B.V. ( Dutch company owned by Lauder) under the
Netherlands Czech BIT.  The two tribunals reached radically different results despite the
similarity of the two BITs; most significantly, the London tribunal declined to find an
expropriation, while the Stockholm tribunal, on the same facts, determined that an arbitration had
indeed taken place.21  A Swedish court reviewing the Stockholm decision concluded that it
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22 See id., at 1567 (recounting the rationale of the Svea Court of Appeal in declining
to resolve the conflict between the two awards); Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic B.V.,
42 I.L.M. 919 (Swedish Court of Appeals 2003).
23 See, e.g., SGS v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 (2003) [hereinafter Pakistan Award], available at http://
www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGS-decision.pdf, holding that an “umbrella clause” in a BIT
does not convert a contract breach into a treaty breach, and SGS v. Republic of the Philippines, 
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Philippines Award], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGSvPhil-final.pdf, reaching the opposite conclusion, both
discussed in Susan Franck, supra note 1, at 1569-1574.
24 When the author suggested in a telephone conversation with one of the U.S.
officials involved of the discussions of an appellate facility agreement within the U.S.
Government may have been more difficult than the upcoming negotiations with the other
CAFTA-DR parties, the official did not disagree. [hereinafter “U.S. Official’s Observations”]
(Memorandum of conversation, Aug. 23, 2005; copy on file with author.)  
25 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv)
(2002) [hereinafter “TPA”]; emphasis supplied.
lacked jurisdiction to reconcile the two decisions, in part because the awards involved different
parties (Lauder in the London action, the Dutch company in the Swedish case).22  However,
numerous other conflicts among tribunals considering the same BIT language exist.23
For many commentators, the question is not simply whether one is for or against an
appellate mechanism, but whether one favors a particular mechanism and standard of review, and
how one would deal with the practical problems in making the concept a reality.  Even within a
particular government, it seems reasonable to assume that there may be differences of views
among agencies, with those principally responsible for protection of foreign investment world-
wide perhaps less enthusiastic about de novo review than the domestic agencies responsible for
implementing environmental policies or defending the government against foreign investor
claims.24
Insofar as I have been able to determine, the appellate mechanism concept– in the United
States at least–  appears formally for the first time in the Trade Promotion Authority provisions
of the Trade Act of 2002   “[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
foreign investment are . . . to secure for investors important rights comparable to those that
would be available under United States legal principles and practice, by . . . providing for an
appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of trade
agreements . . . .”25
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26 See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801 et seq.,
Senate Rept. 107-139, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 28, 2002, at 16 [hereinafter “TPA Senate
Report”].
27 TPA, supra note 25, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv) (2002).
The Senate Report provides the rationale:
[N[egotiators should seek to establish a single appellate body to review decisions
in investor-state disputes.  As the United States enters into more investment
agreements and the number of investor-state disputes grows, the need for
consistency of interpretation of common terms– such as expropriation and fair and
equitable treatment– will grow.  Absent such consistency, key terms may be given
different meanings depending on which arbitrators are appointed to interpret them. 
This will detract from the predictability of rights conferred under investment
agreements.  A single appellate mechanism to review the decisions of arbitral
panels under various investment agreements should help to address this issue and
minimize the risk of aberrant interpretations.26
The “Trade Negotiating Objectives”  set out on the President’s Trade Promotion
Authority provide in pertinent part that “
[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign
investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to
foreign investment . . . and to secure for investors important rights comparable to
those that would be available under United States legal principles and practice,
by–
. . .
(G) seeking to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes between an investor
and a government through–
. . .
(iv) providing for an appellate body or similar mechanism to
provide coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions
in trade agreements . . .27
Accordingly, the first two FTAs concluded under TPA, The U.S.-Chile FTA and the
U.S.-Singapore FTA, provide:
Within three years after the date of entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties
-8-
28 See United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, Annex 10-H,
United States - Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, exchange of letters between
USTR Robert Zoellick and Minister for Trade and Industry George Yeo, May 6, 2003, all
available at http://www.ustr.gov.
29 See United States - Morocco Free Trade Agreement, Jun. 15, 2004, Annex 10-D,
available at http://www.ustr.gov. ; 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Nov. 2004, Annex E, available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/38602.htm (visited Aug. 8, 2005).
30 See For a discussion of the FTAA and its possibly fatal negotiation problems, see
David A. Gantz, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Idea Whose Time has Come– and
Gone?, 1 LOYOLA INT’L L. REV. 179 (2004); Kevin C. Kennedy, The FTAA Negotiations:   A
Melodrama in Five Acts, 1 LOYOLA INT’L L. REV. 121 (2004) (both discussing the problems that
have led to a suspension of negotiations).
shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism
to review awards rendered under Article 10.25 in arbitrations commenced after
they establish the appellate body or similar mechanism.28
Similar language is found in the U.S. - Morocco Free Trade Agreement and in the 2004 U.S. -
Model BIT(in the latter case the provision is entitled, “Possibility of a Bilateral Appellate
Mechanism,” a somewhat lukewarm endorsement).29  Such appellate mechanism language might
also find its way into an FTAA investment chapter if an FTAA is ever concluded– an
increasingly remote possibility-- and if the agreement covers investment, which is even more
remote.30
CAFTA-DR, possibly because of Congressional dissatisfaction with the bare-bones
formulation in the Singapore and Chile FTAs and the lack of a short deadline for negotiations,
offers a much more detailed instruction on developing an appellate mechanism:
1.  Within three months of entry into force of the Agreement, the
[Fair Trade] Commission shall establish a Negotiating Group to
develop an appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards
rendered by tribunals under this Chapter. Such appellate body or
similar mechanism shall be designed to provide coherence to the 
interpretation of investment provisions in the Agreement. The
Commission shall direct the Negotiating Group to take into
account the following issues, among others:
(a) the nature and composition of an appellate body or similar
mechanism;
(b) the applicable scope and standard of review;
(c) transparency of proceedings of an appellate body or similar
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31 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, Annex 10-F.
mechanism;
(d) the effect of decisions by an appellate body or similar mechanism;
(e) the relationship of review by an appellate body or similar mechanism to
the arbitral rules that may be selected under Articles 10.16 and 10.25; and
(f) the relationship of review by an appellate body or similar mechanism to
existing domestic laws and international law on the enforcement of arbitral
awards.
2.  The Commission shall direct the Negotiating Group to provide
to the Commission, within one year of establishment of the
Negotiating Group, a draft amendment to the Agreement that
establishes an appellate body or similar mechanism. Upon approval
of the draft amendment by the Parties, in accordance with Article
22.2 (Amendments), the Agreement shall be so amended.31
The entry into force of CAFTA-DR, expected January 1, 2006, will as noted earlier
trigger a one-year process that may result in some sort of an agreement contemplating the
establishment of an appellate mechanism, at least for the seven CAFTA-DR partners.  The
CAFTA-DR language, however, leaves open key issues, including whether the appellate
mechanism is to guard against aberrant interpretations of the treaty or international law that
jeopardize major public policy objectives, correct erroneous arbitral decisions on law and/or fact,
or both.  Most significantly, despite the short deadline proffered for initiating and completing the
negotiations, there is no time table for submission of the agreement as an amendment to the
Parties’ congresses for approval.  Thus, it is entirely possible that the CAFTA-DR language
regarding negotiation of an appellate mechanism agreement could be fully complied with,
without any implementing action being taken by the Parties for months or even years.
Presumably, the Senate Report, and extended inter-agency discussions,  have provided the
necessary guidance to the U.S negotiators in this respect, but it is unclear whether the proponents
in Congress and elsewhere have given much thought as to how the concept would be
implemented.  It is also difficult to see how negotiators from only seven nations, parties to a
single FTA, could themselves establish an appellate mechanism with broader jurisdiction,
without the active participation of other interested nations, or the ICSID Secretariat. Even so, an
all CAFTA-DR appellate mechanism could be a significant first step, and the agreement could
always provide for an ad hoc appellate mechanism initially, use under other U.S. BITs and FTAs
to the extent such agreements are negotiated and, ultimately, for folding this mechanism into one
at ICSID if and when one is established there.  
It is also notable that all seven CAFTA-DR Parties are also parties to the ICSID
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32 Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
“ICSID Convention”].
33 See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories to the Convention, updated
May 25, 2005, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm  (visited
Aug. 8, 2005).
34 Additional Facility Rules, Rule 2(a), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm (visited Aug. 11, 2005).  This means the
Additional Facility is not available under CAFTA-DR, since all seven Parties are also Parties to
the ICSID Convention, despite the inclusion of the Additional Facility in the list of alternative
mechanism open to the parties to a dispute.  CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, art. 10.16(3)(b).
35 Id., art. 3.
36 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, art. 10:16:3(a).
37 See ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 2, Annex.
38 Id. at 4.
Convention, providing a respected and widely used framework for investor-state disputes,32 while
the use of the Convention provisions and ICSID Arbitral Rules are impossible under NAFTA
because neither Canada nor Mexico are parties to ICSID.33  The ICSID facilities are, however,
available to some non-Parties under the ICSID Additional Facility Arbitral Rules, as long as
either the government of the investor claimant or the respondent government is a Party to
ICSID.34  The provisions of the ICSID Convention, including those that relate to the Annulment
Committee, do not apply to Additional Facility proceedings.35  However, a non-ICSID appellate
mechanism may create a conflict with the CAFTA-DR Parties’ obligations to use the Annulment
Committee for ICSID Arbitrations, should the parties to a dispute elect to arbitrate under the
ICSID Convention, one of the options under the investment chapter.36 (This problem could be
avoided if the scope of the appellate mechanism were limited to non-ICSID Convention
arbitrations, leaving ICSID arbitrations for review by the Annulment Committee.)
The appellate mechanism idea is not solely a U.S./CAFTA-DR concept, even if the
inclusion of appellate mechanism negotiating commitments in U.S. FTAs is likely driving
discussions elsewhere.  Presumably to stake out its claim as a logical situs for a single investment
appellate mechanism, the ICSID Secretariat, in October  2004, issued its own proposal for an
appellate mechanism to be located at ICSID.37  The ICSID “Discussion Paper” asks “whether an
appellate mechanism is desirable to ensure coherence and consistency in case law generated in
ICSID and other investor-to-state arbitrations initiated investment treaties”38 and concluded that
the answer is indeed “yes.”  The paper further asserted that 
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39 Id. at 15.
40 ICSID Convention, supra note 32, Art. 52; emphasis added.
it would seem to run counter to the objectives of coherence and consistency for
different appeal mechanisms to be set up under each treaty concerned.  Efficiency
and economy, as well as coherence and consistency, might best be served by
ICSID offering a single appeal mechanism as an alternative to multiple
mechanisms.39
While the ICSID paper, as noted earlier, no longer formally exists, it was quite useful
bureaucratically in making a forceful argument for locating any investment appellate mechanism
at ICSID, and many of the ideas espoused will undoubtedly be revived, and at least be considered
by the CAFTA-DR negotiators,  if the negotiations under CAFTA-DR move forward as
mandated.
II. Review of Arbitral Tribunal Decisions
An initial question is why a new or separate appellate mechanism for investment disputes
is needed when tribunal awards are already subject to review by the ICSID Annulment
Committee or by national courts.  As indicated below, a limited form of review is currently a
feature of investor-state arbitration.
A. Review of ICSID Arbitral Awards
An award by a tribunal operating under the ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules is
already to subject to limited review, to annulment “on one or more of the following grounds”:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.40
An ad hoc committee of three is appointed from a panel of arbitrators, with the authority
to annul the award or any part of it; if the award is annulled either party to the arbitration may
request that the dispute be submitted to a new tribunal.
The ICSID Annulment Committee overturned some ICSID decisions in favor of
investors, particularly in the early years; the first three awards reviewed by the Committee were
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41 See Holidan, Klockner, et al. v. Cameroon, ICSID Case NO. ARB/81/2, 1 ICSID
REV. FOR. INV. L. J. 90 (1986); Amoco v. Indonesia, ICSID Case no. ARB/81/1 (Nov. 20, 1984),
25 ILM 1441 (1986).
42 Knull & Rubins, supra note 1, at 553.
43 ICSID Case no. ARB/98/4 (Jan. 28, 2002), 14 ILM 933 (2002).
44 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine
Republic (Jul. 3, 2002), 41 ILM 1135 (2002).
45 Daniel Q. Posin, Recent Developments in ICSID Annulment Procedures, 13
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 170, 171 (2002).
46 ICSID Convention, supra note 32, art. 25.
47 Id., art. 52(3).
48 NAFTA, art. 1120.  
set aside.41  It has been suggested that this was less a result of “appellate scope or systemic
weakness” than inexperience of the arbitrators and the committee with ICSID rules.42  Several
recent annulment committee decisions have found in the investor’s favor.  For example, in Wena
Hotels, Ltd. v. Egypt43,   the Committee rejected Egypt’s claims that the ICSID tribunal had failed
to apply the applicable law, or had departed from a fundamental rule of procedure.  In Vivendi
Annulment44, the Committee accepted the investor’s claim and annulled the Tribunal’s refusal to
exercise jurisdiction even where its jurisdiction existed, determining that by so refusing the
Tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers under ICSID Conv., art. 52(1)(b).  One observer has
concluded that “[I]f there were any doubt before, there is no doubt now that parties cannot
routinely expect to be able to annul ICSID awards.45
However, the Annulment Committee has its shortcomings.  First, like the ICSID
Convention itself, it is available only for disputes in which both the investor and the home state
are parties to the Convention.46  Secondly, the Annulment Committee is not a single body, but a
panel of arbitrators from which an ad hoc committee is chosen in each instance.47  Thus, the
likelihood of consistency among decisions of the Annulment Committee is at best moderate,
since different arbitrators are deciding different cases.
B. Court Review of NAFTA Chapter 11 Awards
Of course, the ICSID Annulment Committee procedures are not available for arbitral
awards rendered under NAFTA, since as noted earlier neither Mexico nor Canada are Parties to
the ICSID Convention.  Arbitration under NAFTA must proceed under either the UNCITRAL
Rules or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.48   While the use of the ICSID Additional Facility
-13-
49 See Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador,
(Final Award), Jul. 1, 2004 (arbitration under the U.S. - Ecuador BIT administered by the
London Court of Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules), available at 
http://www.asil.org/ilib/OEPC-Ecuador.pdf (visited Aug. 23, 2005); Lauder/CMS cases, supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
50 See NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1136:3. 
51 For example, in Feldman v. United Mexican States, 42 I.L.M. 625 (2003) (ICSID
(W. Bank) Dec. 16, 2002), where the Claimant was a United States citizen and the Respondent
was Mexico, it seemed logical to the Tribunal (and, apparently, to the parties), to choose Ottawa,
Ontario, Canada as the place of arbitration, and that is what happened.  (See ¶ 26.)
52 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.  See NAFTA, Art.
1130:1. 
has historically been largely limited to NAFTA cases, arbitration under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules is common in investor-state arbitration under both NAFTA and BITs.49
In either instance, a court proceeding may be brought to set aside or annul the award,  in
the state which is the situs (place) of the arbitration.50  It appears to be largely as a result of
expediency that Canada had been designated as the situs of most arbitrations under NAFTA to
date51, although arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11 can be held in any nation that is a party to
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards.52  It is
generally accepted that the national courts in the place of arbitration cannot be deprived of
jurisdiction over arbitral decisions rendered in their territories (except to the extent that the
Parties to the ICSID Convention have agreed otherwise as, for example, in their acceptance of
the Annulment Committee as the sole body for review).
However, some states do restrict the scope of court review of arbitral decisions within
their territories (in part because those involved in international commercial arbitration tend to
avoid siting arbitral proceedings in states where the scope of review is broad).  Many, including
several jurisdictions in Canada,  have  have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration:
(1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for
setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article. 
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in article 6 only if: 
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that: 
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was
under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the
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53 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985, art. 34,
available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html
(visited Aug. 8, 2005);emphasis added.
54 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.arbitration.recognition.and.enforcement.convention.new.york.1958/
doc.html (visited Aug. 8, 2005).
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of this State; or 
(ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of
the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or
was otherwise unable to present his case; or 
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only
that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not
submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or 
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties,
unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Law
from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with this Law; or 
(b) the court finds that: 
(I) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of this State; or 
(ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State.53
* * *
Article 34 of the Model Law, which closely follows Article V of the New York
Convention54,  thus sets forth a very limited scope of review.  Investors are likely to seek as the
situs of arbitration states which have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, where experience
indicates that the courts will undertake only that limited review and not a de novo review of
either the facts or the law as determined by the tribunal.  However, despite this attempt at
uniformity of approach, national court review is not likely to provide a high level of consistency,
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58 Id., ¶ 42.
even in a particular country, because inevitably different judges sit on different cases, and some
have more experience with arbitral award review than others.
Under NAFTA Chapter 11 to date, all three annulment actions have been brought in
Canadian provincial or federal courts– in the province designated as the situs of the arbitration--
where the courts have applied the grounds set forth in Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Commercial Arbitration, as adopted in Canada. 
1.  In United Mexican States v. Metalclad, before the British Columbia Supreme Court [a court
of first instance], the court concluded that the Tribunal acted beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration by finding a transparency requirement in Chapter 11 as the basis for determining
that Mexico had violated arts. 1105 (fair and equitable treatment) and 1110 (expropriation) of 
NAFTA.55  (The tribunal’s finding of indirect expropriation was upheld on other grounds.)  The
decision does raise some confusion as to the proper scope of review under Article 34 of the
UNCITRAL Model Act as applied in Canada; the principal arbitral holding was characterized as
a “misstatement of the applicable law.”56  In so finding, the court implicitly determined that it had
jurisdiction to review alleged errors of law.
2.  In S.D. Myers v. Mexico, a federal court sitting in Ottawa upheld the arbitral tribunal.57  The
court declined to review a jurisdictional challenge based on Canada’s allegation that there was no
“investment” by S.D. Myers in a very formalistic approach.  Since Canada  raised a jurisdictional
issue without labeling it as such in its Statement of Defense, according to the court Canada
effectively waived its right to submit the issue as a “jurisdictional” challenge.  More broadly, the
court applied what it said was a  “correctness” standard of review for legal issues (such as the
meaning of the word “investor”) and a “reasonableness” standard for application of facts to legal
issues: “Article 34 of the Code [UNCITRAL Model Code as adopted in Canada] does not allow
for judicial review if the decision is based on an error of law or an erroneous finding of fact if the
decision is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”58
If the court in Metalclad had applied this standard it presumably would have affirmed the
tribunal.  Also, in S.D. Myers, presumed concerns over court review led to determinations “in the
alternative.”  Subsequent to the issuance of the court’s opinion, S.D. Myers and Canada
apparently both accepted the judgment.
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59 United Mexican States v. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa, Ontario Superior Court of
Justice, File no. 03-CV-23500 (Dec. 2, 2003), ¶ 77.
60 Id., ¶ 87.
61 United Mexican States v. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa, Court of Appeal for
Ontario, Jan. 12, 2005, available at http://naftaclaims.com (visited Aug. 8, 2005).
62 Id. at para. 37.
63 Canfor Corp. v. United States, May 23, 20002.  This action alleges that the United
States violated various provisions of NAFTA, Chapter 11, in assessing anti-dumping and
countervailing duties against softwood lumber imported from Canada.
3.   In United Mexican States v. Feldman, an Ontario court of first instance, in dismissing the
challenge, afforded the tribunal a high degree of deference: “In my view, a high level of
deference should be accorded to the Tribunal, especially in cases where the Appellant Mexico is
in reality challenging a finding of fact.  The panel who has heard the evidence is best able to
determine issues or credibility, reliability and onus of proof.”59  The Court also indicated that the
public policy exception to enforcement should be invoked only when the award “must
fundamentally offend the most basic and explicit principles of justice and fairness in Ontario, or
evidence intolerable ignorance or corruption on the part of the arbitral Tribunal.”60  The Mexican
government’s appeal resulted in an affirmation by the appellate court.61  Interestingly, the Court
of Appeal for Ontario (Ontario’s highest court), despite the continued participation of the
Attorney General of Canada in support of Mexico, noted that “Quite Apart from principles of
international comity, our domestic law in Canada dictates a high degree of deference for
decisions of specialized tribunals generally and for awards of consensual arbitration tribunals in
particular.”62
III. The Rationale for an Appellate Mechanism
As noted earlier, some members of the U.S. Senate and Congress, government agencies
and NGOs have been concerned about the lack of an appellate process under NAFTA Chapter
11, so that ad hoc arbitrators cannot be controlled, and any  legal errors are made cannot be
effectively corrected for the current or for future cases.  The fears are particularly acute where
major public policy issues are being decided, e.g., whether regulatory action can be considered
expropriatory (Methanex), or whether imposition of unfair trade remedies (anti-dumping and
countervailing duties) are subject to challenge under NAFTA, Chapter 11 (Canfors63).  Concerns
over tribunal errors are not unknown among foreign investors themselves, particularly in “bet the
company” arbitrations with foreign states.
Under NAFTA, Article 1131:2, “An interpretation of the [Fair Trade] Commission of a
-17-
64 See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, (Jul. 31, 2001),
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(visited Mar. 31, 2003). 
65 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, (Award on Damages) (May 31, 2002), 41 ILM 1342
(2002).
66 Mondev v. United States (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003).
provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section.”  This
power of interpretation may offer some relief from such errors, but its utility is uncertain.  For an
Interpretation to be issued, the three NAFTA governments must agree that an Interpretation is
appropriate regarding the affected issue, and agree on the text.  Only one Interpretation has been
issued during the first twelve years of NAFTA.64  Also, at least one tribunal (Pope & Talbot65)
has suggested that it was appropriate for the tribunal to determine whether the Interpretation
really an ultra vires effort by the Parties to amend NAFTA.  (The tribunal in  Mondev66
disagreed.)   While the NAFTA Parties who are not parties to a particular Chapter 11 arbitration
are free to “make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation of this Agreement”
(Article 1128), the tribunal has no obligation to accept such views.
Moreover, despite the lack of formal precedential value of earlier arbitral decisions–
NAFTA, Art. 1136:1 states that “An award made by a Tribunal shall have no binding force
except between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case”– prior decisions are
being regularly cited by parties to arbitrations, which effectively requires tribunals to discuss,
distinguish and/or follow those earlier decisions.  This increases the risk for concerned
governments, NGOs or private investor groups in leaving an allegedly erroneous decision
unchallenged.
There is obviously some dissatisfaction with national court review (particularly in recent
Canadian NAFTA cases), either because courts have only limited experience with the issues or
themselves make flawed interpretations of complex treaty provisions or principles of
international law, or because the courts are giving too much (or too little) deference to the
tribunals.  Judges in general, except for the few that regularly deal with such issues as
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and sovereign immunity (e.g., those in the Southern
District of New York or sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, or perhaps on the
federal courts in Washington, D.C.), have at best limited expertise in such issues, certainly less
than one could reasonably expect from an appellate mechanism of investment law experts.  After
the Canadian experiences some of the pending NAFTA arbitrations have selected Washington,
D.C. as the situs, but to date there have been no reviews in Washington, D.C. courts of NAFTA
arbitral decisions.  With court annulment procedures, the result may ultimately be a three step
process (as in Feldman), an arbitral award under ICSID Additional Facility or UNCITRAL
Rules; appeal to a court of first instance, followed by an appeal of the court decision to an
appellate court in the same jurisdiction.  The cost and time burdens for the parties are potentially
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68 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, Annual Report for 2004, Annex 2 WTO Doc.
WT/AB/3 (Jan. 2005) [hereinafter Appellate Body 2004 Report.
69 Id. at Annex 3.
70 See DSU, supra note 67, art. 4 (establishing that trade dispute resolution under the
DSU begins with consultations between the affected WTO Members).
63 WTO Secretariat, Dispute Settlement: The Disputes - Disputes, Chronologically,
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2005).
significant.
For major companies and governments, there is probably less concern with time and cost
considerations for an extended arbitral process (including an appeal)  when the issues are of
broad public interest (governments) or involve “bet the company” issues (private investors).  Few
today few really believe that international arbitration, particularly between private investors and
states, is any quicker or cheaper than, for example, U.S. federal court litigation, even though the
discovery process is more circumscribed in an international arbitration.  However, small
investors (e.g., Marvin Feldman) or developing country governments may be discouraged from
using the process by the existence of a more formal appellate process and the greater prospect
that it will be used on a regular basis.
Consideration of the investment appellate mechanism concept has and will continue to be
influenced by the general success of the WTO’s Appellate Body67 in resolving international trade
disputes.  During the past nearly eleven years, the WTO Appellate Body has generally proved
itself able to produce consistent decisions in a very timely (90 days) fashion, with a high level of
expertise and analysis.  A total of 67 appeals to the Appellate Body were filed between 1995 and
the end of 2004, although none were filed in 1995.68  The number of appeals peaked in 2000,
with thirteen; they increased each year from 1995 to 2000, and have decreased each year since
2000.  Over the period 1995-2003, 67% of all panel reports were appealed to the Appellate
Body.69  (The total number of consultations under the Dispute Settlement Understanding70
reached 332 by mid-August 2005.63) Many, including some high U.S. government officials and
members of Congress– some of whom are currently supporting an investment appellate
mechanism– have been critical of some of the WTO Appellate Body decisions, but few have
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attacked the concept in general.  While the experience of the WTO is not fully transferable to the
investment appellate mechanism concept– in particular, the WTO’s Appellate Body is applying a
limited number of international trade agreements while an ICSID Appellate Body could
ultimately be applying the differing provisions of hundreds of BITs and FTAs– there are obvious
useful parallels.
IV. Standard of Review - Level of Deference to Tribunals
Perhaps the single most important issue facing negotiators of an appellate mechanism,
upon which governments and private investors are likely to differ, is the standard of review.  The
possible range of standards runs the gamut from the high degree of deference and narrow
standards of review incorporated in the  ICSID and UNCITRAL Model Law standards, discussed
earlier, to a de novo review at the opposite end of the spectrum.  As noted above, the ICSID
Annulment Committee normally vacates an arbitral decision only when  “the Tribunal has
manifestly exceeded its powers.”  Under UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 34, a court is to annul
the tribunal’s award when “[T]he award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration....” and on a few other grounds, such as the award being
contrary to public policy.
In Canadian practice, where the UNCTRAL Model Law standards have been adopted,
this has been interpreted as correctness on law, reasonableness on applying the law to facts (S.D.
Myers); and a “high degree of deference” (Feldman) although the application of the standard has
not been fully consistent, as noted above.
Where the arbitral situs is outside the United States, the international provisions of the
Federal Arbitration Act (the same grounds as apply to enforcement under the New York
Convention) would apply for review by U.S. courts.64  Where the situs of the international
arbitration  is in the United States– in Washington, D.C., for example, as in several pending
NAFTA cases– both the domestic and international sections of Federal Arbitration Act would be
applicable, including the criterion of “manifest disregard of law”.65  While no U.S. court
decisions reviewing NAFTA arbitrations exist to date, it is reasonable to expect that U.S. court
review will afford a high degree of deference to NAFTA and similar investment arbitrations, as
occurs with review of other types of arbitral awards, or in enforcement actions under the New
York Convention.
Presumably, the NGOs and at least some government supporters of the appellate
mechanism concept have in mind a broader scope of review.  For example, Canada, the
respondent in S.D. Myers, argued unsuccessfully that the appropriate standard of review is
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Disputes, Art. 17:6, available at http://www.wto.org (visited Aug. 8, 2005).
68 Thus, in Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
WT/DS245/AB/R, AB-2003-4 (issued Nov. 26, 2003, adopted Dec. 10, 2003), rejected certain
challenges to the Panel’s fact-finding, indicating that it “would not base a finding of
inconsistency with [DSU] Article 11 simply on the conclusion that we might have reached a
different factual finding from the one the panel reached.” Id., ¶ 222(quoting EC- Asbestos
Appellate Body Report, ¶ 159).  It also suggested that certain other panel conclusions were within
the panel’s “margin of discretion” in evaluating the relevant evidence.  Id., ¶ 221.  For a
comprehensive analysis of WTO standard of review practice, See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and
Nicholas Lockhart, Standard of Review in WTO Law, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 491 (2004).
69 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
70 [I]n its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the
authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was
unbiased and objective.  If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was
unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the
evaluation shall not be overturned.”  WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, Art. 17.6(i).
71 See discussion at Part II(A), supra.
“correctness” not only with regard to the law but to the application of facts to the law, a broader
standard than that applied to review of arbitrations involving only private parties.66  One
possibility is the WTO Appellate Body standard for review of Panel decisions, empowering the
Appellate Body to review  “issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel.”67   In practice, the WTO Appellate Body has essentially followed this
approach.  The panels are given relatively little leeway with regard to issues of law, but
considerable discretion with regard to their factual determinations.68
The Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council69  standard, which calls for deference
to the expert tribunal below, contemplating affirmation even where the reviewing court might
have reached a different conclusion, but reversal where the tribunal below makes legal errors, is
certainly one which could logically be adapted in principle for an appellate mechanism for
investment disputes, given the obvious specialized expertise of most investor-state arbitration
tribunals.  Effectively, that standard has been adopted for panel review of administering agency
decisions under the WTO’s Antidumping Agreement.70
One interesting approach to the standard of review approach is found in the ICSID
Secretariat’s Discussion Paper, which proposes the following:
An award could be challenged pursuant to the Appeals Facility Rules for a clear
error of law or on any of the five grounds for annulment of an award set out in
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.71  A further ground for challenging an award
might consist in serious errors of fact; this ground would be narrowly defined to
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preserve appropriate deference to the findings of fact of the arbitral tribunal.72
The inclusion of “errors of law” is consistent with the earlier discussion, and is likely to be found
in any appellate mechanism proposal that reaches fruition.  However, it is doubtful that there
could be review of “serious errors of fact” without the review process leading to an effective  de
novo review by the appellate mechanism.  There is obviously a significant risk that this could
become a “Pandora’s Box” for either or both parties to the proceedings at the tribunal level to
reintroduce existing facts or introduce new ones to buttress its case that the tribunal had made
“serious” errors, by submitting a voluminous factual record.  Surely, any factual error important
enough, if proven, to change the result would necessarily be considered “serious” by the party
allegedly adversely affected.  
Accordingly, inclusion of the broad power by the appellate mechanism to review factual
determinations made by the original arbitral tribunal is likely to be strenuously opposed by the
investment bar, although it might well be supported by Canada and Mexico, among other state
respondents, as a means of further reducing the risk of an adverse tribunal ruling directing the
government to pay money to a foreign investor.
It is reported that the U.S. government, in preparation for the CAFTA-DR negotiating
group, has agreed internally on a middle ground.  Review of legal issues would not be either de
novo or subject to the more limited Chevron standard but, rather, to an intermediate “clear legal
error” standard.73  Review of alleged factual errors would be narrow, limited to situations where
the complaining party could demonstrate that “no reasonable trier of facts” could have reached
the conclusion found by the tribunal.74   If this approach could be negotiated with the other
CAFTA-DR parties, it would represent a reasonable compromise among divergent interests both
in the United States and in the other Party nations.
V. Other Hurdles in Creating an Appellate Mechanism
The legal and practical challenges to the idea are also significant.  In addition to choice of
the appropriate standard of review, many other questions arise.  These relate, inter alia,  to the
power of the appellate mechanism to confirm, set aside and remand; issues relating to choice of
law; the relationship of the appellate mechanism process to national court review; the
appropriateness of bonding requirements for appeals; and the complexities of structuring one or
more appellate bodies to deal with multiple agreements.   It could be very difficult to reach
agreement on these issues among investor groups, civil society and governments.
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78 See Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, Special
Session of the Appellate Body (Jun. 6, 2003), at 8, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/tn/ds/9.doc (visited Aug. 16, 2002) (suggesting the
amendment of art. 17(12) of the DSU to permit the complaining party in a WTO dispute to
request the Dispute Settlement Body to remand an issue to the original panel where the factual
findings by the panel were insufficient to permit the Appellate Body to fully address the issue).
79 NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1136(3).
80 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, art. 10.26(6).
81 ICSID Convention, supra note 32, art. 52(5).
82 CIEL/NGO Letter, supra note 16, at 1.
A.  Procedural and Jurisdictional Issues
There is no reversal authority for NAFTA, Chapter 19 (unfair trade disputes), only the
authority to affirm or remand.75 The ICSID Annulment Committee may affirm or annul, but not
effectively remand; at the request of either part, the dispute is to be submitted to a new tribunal,
presumably to start over.76  The WTO Appellate Body has no remand authority to panels, but
only to “uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.”77  (Among
the reforms of the DSU being considered by the WTO as part of the Doha Development Round is
authority for the Appellate Body to remand cases to the panels for further proceedings in
appropriate circumstances.78) 
Under NAFTA, a claimant may not enforce an award until 120 days have elapsed without
a party seeking annulment under ICSID, or three months have elapsed without any disputing
party having sought revision or annulment under the ICSID Facility Rules or UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.79 (CAFTA-DR contains similar language.80)  The ICSID Annulment
Committee is granted specific authority to stay enforcement of the underlying award pending the
committee decision.81
Is, as most assume, the investment appellate mechanism to be a substitute for situs court
review, or would it be an additional step? If part of the problem with the current system is court
review in the state of the situs, shouldn’t that step be eliminated, effectively to be replaced with
the appellate mechanism?  One selling point of an appellate mechanism to the investment
community is the possible elimination of two situs court appeals, to the court of first instance and
then to the appellate level, a costly process in both time and money.  However, some NGO
groups opposed to NAFTA Chapter 11 in general have expressed their “strong opposition to any
provisions in an appellate mechanism that would eliminate domestic legal review of arbitral
provisions,”82 even though such court review is very circumscribed today, as discussed in Part II,
above.
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B. Transparency of the Proceedings
NAFTA itself provides that the final award may be made public if either the government
or the private party wishes to do so (in the case of Canada or the United States), or in accordance
with the applicable arbitration rules (Mexico).83 Even the formal notice initiating arbitration may
not be public if neither party decides to release it. Most of the NAFTA transparency rules were
add-ons.  In July 2001, the NAFTA Parties stated that “nothing in NAFTA imposes a general
duty of confidentiality” and agreed that they would “make available to the public in a timely
manner all documents submitted to, or issued by, Chapter 11 tribunals” subject to certain
exceptions for confidential or privileged information. In October 2003, Canada and the United
States, but not Mexico, issued statement indicating that they would consent– and request
disputing investors and tribunals to consent– to holding hearings that are open to the public,
subject to measures to protect confidential business information.84  In October 2003, Canada and
the United States, again without Mexico, issued a statement indicating that they would consent–
and request disputing investors and tribunals to consent– to holding hearings that are open to the
public, subject to measures to protect confidential business information.85  At the same time, a
statement was issued setting forth procedures for non-disputing party (amicus curiae)
participation in Chapter 11 proceedings.86
Subsequent agreements, such as CAFTA-DR and the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, incorporate
similar transparency and third-party participation language directly in the text of the
agreements.87  They also reflect transparency requirements in the TPA.88  NGOs, in commenting
on the appellate mechanism concept, have urged, inter alia,  that it incorporate provisions for
amicus curie briefs and open hearings.89  Even the ICSID Secretariat has proposed modifications
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in the Arbitration Rules which would facilitate open hearings and the receipt of amicus briefs
when the tribunal so determined after consultation with the parties.90  It can thus be reasonably
assumed that any appellate mechanism agreement negotiated by the CAFTA-DR parties will
incorporate transparency provisions similar to applicable in CAFTA-DR to the conduct of
tribunal proceedings, perhaps simply by reference.91
C. Bonding Requirements
Also, to protect investors, should an appealing government be required to post a bond
equal to the amount of the arbitral tribunal’s award pending appeal?  This is a common
requirement in U.S. courts, as a precondition for appeal, due to the lengthy delays that occur
when review takes place.  The bonding requirement was a key element in Loewen. Because the
claimant allegedly could not meet bonding requirements for an appeal, set at $625 million,
Loewen settled the case for $175 million, “under conditions of extreme duress” and brought a
Chapter 11 claim.92
There is no specific provision in ICSID for such a requirement, which would apply in
most instances to an appealing government. However, at least four of the ad hoc ICSID
Annulment Committees have continued the stay for enforcement for the tribunal’s award only on
condition that the applicant for the stay (the respondent government) provide a bank guarantee or
bond for payment of the Award,93 and a stay has been continued only once under circumstances
where no bond or other security was required.94   The ICSID Discussion Paper proposes that the
appealing state be required to post a bank guaranty or bond in the amount  of the award.95  (The
bonding issue would not likely arise where the investor is seeking review of the tribunal’s award, 
since she would not be appealing unless her request for compensation had been denied.)  This
feature of the proposal would likely be strenuously opposed by the ICSID member governments
negotiating an appellate mechanism.  However, it  may well be a make-or-break issue with the
investment bar.96  Thus, it makes eminent sense for the United States to include the bonding
requirements in its negotiating proposal for CAFTA-DR.97
D. Choice of Law
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98 DSU, supra note 67, art. 1(1).  These agreements consist of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and its more than twenty annexed
agreements dealing with trade in goods, trade in services, trade-related intellectual property
rights, and resolution of disputes.
99 In EC - Hormones, the Appellate Body considered whether the “precautionary
principle” used in part by the EC to justify its ban on imports of hormone-fed beef was a
principle of customary international law, deciding in the negative. EC Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS 26, 48/AB/R, adopted Feb. 13, 1998, available at
http://www.wto.org.
100 NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 132(1).
101 ID., art. 1105(1).
102 Pope & Talbot v. Canada (Merits, Phase II) (Apr. 10, 2001), para. 110, available
at  http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeFinalMeritsAward.pdf (visited Sep. 8,
2005).
103 NAFTA, art. 1131(2) provides that “An interpretation by the [Free Trade]
Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under
this Section.” 
If the investment appellate mechanism is to review issues of law decided by investment
tribunals, it, like the tribunals, will have to decide what law applies.  One of the differences
between the WTO Appellate Body and any proposed for investment disputes is the fact that the
WTO Appellate Body is applying in all cases a defined body of international trade law, the
“covered agreements.”98  Reference to outside international law sources, other than the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties for interpretative purposes, has been rare99
The issues tend to more complex even under individual bilateral investment treaties and
free trade agreements.  Even NAFTA is less straightforward than might be imagined from the
text: Chapter 11 tribunals are directed to “decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this
Agreement and applicable rules of international law.”100 Yet, this has led under NAFTA to
considerable litigation over the concept of “international law.”  For example, Article 1105 states
that “Each Party shall accord to investment of investors of another Party treatment in accordance
with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”101
The scope of the concept “fair and equitable treatment” under international law has never been
clear, and the water was muddied early on when the Tribunal in Pope & Talbot initially
determined that this quoted language provided claimants with a right that was in addition to
rather than limited by the phrase “treatment in accordance with international law.”102
The concerns of the NAFTA Parties over this Pope & Talbot deviation prompted the first
and to date only binding “Interpretation” of NAFTA Chapter 11,103  which, inter alia, stated that
“The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law
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104 See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, (Jul. 31, 2001),
available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp?format=print>
(visited Mar. 31, 2003). 
105 U.S. - Chile FTA, supra note 28, art. 10.4(1).
106 Id., annex 10-A.
107 2004 Model BIT, supra note 29, art. 5, annex A; CAFTA-DR FTA, supra note
___,  art. 10.5, annex 10-B.
108 U.S. - Chile FTA, supra note 28, arts. 10.21(1) and 10.21(2).
109 US - CAFTA-DR FTA, supra note 3, arts. 10.22(1) and 10.22(2).
110 Once those already approved by Congress (CAFTA-DR, Morocco) enter into
force, the United States will have FTA based investment protection with eleven nations (Canada,
Mexico, Chile, Singapore, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, Morocco);  As of March 2005, the United States had negotiated 47  BITs and 40
were in force.  U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program,
minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”104   In subsequent agreements such as the FTA with
Chile, the governing law is explicitly “customary international law,”105 and customary
international law is explicitly defined as resulting from “a general and consistent practice of
States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation,”106 presumably to discourage tribunals
from relying too extensively on other agreements and arbitral decisions as a source of customary
international law.  The 2004 Model BIT and the CAFTA-DR FTA both contain essentially
identical language.107
However, even in U.S. FTAs this is not the end of the matter.  In the U.S.- Chile FTA, for
example, the governing law for general claims is “this Agreement and applicable rules of
international law,” as in NAFTA; however, when a claims is submitted based on a specific
investment agreement or investment authorization, the tribunal is directed to decide the manner, 
in accordance with the rules of law specified in the pertinent investment
agreement or investment authorization . . .  If the rules of law have not been
specified or otherwise agreed, the tribunal shall apply the law of the respondent
(including its rules on the conflict of laws), the terms of the investment agreement
or investment authorization, such rules of international law as may be applicable,
and this agreement.108
A similar bifurcation– and challenge to the tribunal and any reviewing body– appears in the
CAFTA-DR FTA.109
Such differences obviously would not raise major problems if there is a separate appellate
mechanism for each FTA and BIT, as is contemplated with CAFTA-DR.  However, if a single
appellate mechanism, at ICSID or elsewhere, is ultimately created with jurisdiction over dozens
or hundreds of BITs and FTA investment  provisions, or even covering only the nearly fifty U.S.
FTAs and BITs,110 the level of complexity will be high.
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111 DSU, supra note 67, art. 17(1).
112 Debra P. Steger & Peter Van Den Bossche, WTO Dispute Settlement: Emerging
Practice and Procedure, 92 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 79 (1998)
113 See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, passim, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm (visited Aug. 11, 2005).
114 Based on the best information available (the Todd Weiler website,
http://naftaclaims.com) , approximately forty-one Chapter 11 actions had been filed as of
September 2005, including those which may be dormant.  While this is believed to be a
comprehensive list, the secrecy surrounding the Chapter 11 filing process does not assure that
disputes and the documents filed during the proceedings will be made public.  NAFTA has no
such requirements.  However, an “Interpretation” issued by the Parties July 31, 2001, requires all
documents relating to Chapter 11 provisions, excepting those containing confidential
information, to be made “available to the public in a timely fashion.” Compliance by the
governments (and/or the claimants) appears to be very good.
E. Structure and Membership of an Appellate Mechanism
Should there be permanent members (as with the WTO Appellate Body) or an  ad hoc
tribunal in each instance formed from a standing roster (as with the ICSID Annulment
Committee)?  The WTO Appellate Body calls for a standing roster of seven members, three of
whom serve on each case, in rotation.111  However, in “a practice of collegiality,” all seven
members review briefs, attend hearings, and participate to some extent in the decision-making
process, an approach which adds to the consistency of decisions.112  For the WTO’s Appellate
Body, there have been 6-12 cases a year, and the members are effectively kept busy by the WTO
at least half-time.  
The ICSID Annulment Committee actions, in contrast, are rare; only a handful in forty
years.113
The case load of an investment appellate mechanism will ultimately depend not only on
how many investor - state disputes are filed, but on how many of the more than 2000 BITs and
dozens of FTAs with investment provisions replace the ICSID Annulment Committee and situs
court review with exclusive jurisdiction for the appellate mechanism, if and when a mechanism
is created under ICSID auspices.  A potentially large volume exists, but the number of cases in
actual practice is very difficult to predict.  
Of course, if there are separate appellate mechanisms for each agreement or even group of
agreements  the case load for any individual agreement could be very small.  With NAFTA, there
have been about 40 investment cases filed in eleven years,114 with roughly half brought under the
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(Apr. 30, 2004); Methanex v. United States (Final Award) (Aug. 9, 2005); Robert Azinian,
Kenneth Davitian & Ellen Baca. v.  United Mexican States, Case no. ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1,
1999), 39 I.L.M. 537, 555 (2000); Mondev v. United States, Case no. ARB(AF)/99/2 (Oct. 11,
2002);  ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, Case no. ARB(AF)/00/1 (Jan. 9, 2003); UPS v.
Canada (Award on Jurisdiction) (Nov. 22, 2003)[hereinafter Feldman]; Loewen Group v. United
States (Award) (Jun. 26, 2003), Decision on Request for Consideration (Sep. 13, 2004)
[hereinafter Loewen I and Lowen II, respectively]; Gami Investments v. United Mexican States
(Award) (Nov. 15, 2004) all available at http://naftaclaims.com
119 U.S. Official’s observations, supra note 24.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules115, and the rest under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.116  Had
there been an appellate mechanism with jurisdiction, there might have been more referrals than
there have been to date (3) to the reviewing courts, all involving the relatively rare monetary
awards against the NAFTA Parties.117  If an  appellate mechanism existed and had been
authorized to exercise a broader standard of review than Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model
Law, at least some of the investor claimants whose claims against the NAFTA Parties have been
rejected118 might have brought appeals.  However, even then, it is unlikely that more than an
additional handful of cases would have been appealed.
Since the CAFTA-DR mechanism will likely cover that FTA alone, it would make little
sense to create a standing body as in the WTO.  Rather, as the United States is likely to
propose,119 the only cost-effective option would be a roster system similar to that used in the
ICSID Annulment Committee, in which each CAFTA-DR member government nominates a list
of acceptable individuals, and when an award is referred to the appellate mechanism, three
members are chosen from the rosters.  Presumably, if normal practice is followed, one member
would be nominated by the claimant -  investor, one by the responding state, and the third chosen
by the two or, failing agreement, by the appointing authority, presumably the ICSID Secretary
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General, as in CAFTA-DR arbitrations.120
A related issue is whether party nationals should be permitted to serve, as on investment
tribunals under ICSID and NAFTA, or excluded,  as with ICSID Annulment Committee and with
WTO panels (but not with the Appellate Body).   Given the relative shortage of highly
experienced arbitrators, excluding those from the countries whose nationals are the more frequent
claimants (such as the United States) could make the process difficult or impossible to
administer. 
Would 15  (or more) outstanding investment arbitrators be willing to accept nomination
to serve on an appellate mechanism under CAFTA-DR?  Probably, as long as listing on the roster
did not foreclose their continued work as arbitrators?  The ICSID Secretariat had proposed a
panel of 15 persons of “recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international
investment and investment treaties”, each from a different nation, with three sitting on each
appeal.121  With the CAFTA-DR appellate mechanism, it would make sense initially to require
each government to nominate at least two (and probably not more than five) individuals, who
need not be nationals of the CAFTA-DR nations.   Having non-nationals on the roster would
provide alternatives for chairperson who were perceived as independent from any of the parties,
and the U.S. negotiating proposal apparently contemplates such nominations.122
If there is a large roster, should some of the members be persons with some experience in
environmental law or labor law in addition to or instead of international investment law?  There
is no general bar to such appointments for a roster– as distinct from a standing body– as the
parties could presumably influence the selection or non-selection of the roster members for
individual disputes.  The investment bar in the United States would, however, almost certainly
oppose the appointment of roster members other than recognized international investment law
experts with prior arbitral experience.
Presumably, the costs of individual appeals would be borne by the parties, as is now the
case at ICSID for both tribunals and the Annulment, at the ICSID rate– currently $300 per hour–
or some higher agreed rate.  Certainly, the CDN$800 per day rate currently paid to NAFTA
Chapter 19 and 20 arbitrators123 would not attract the skilled arbitrators required to make a
CAFTA-DR appellate mechanism a success.
F. Conflicts of Interest
-30-
124 [ICSID] Rules of Procedure for Arbitration, Rule 6(2), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partF.htm (visited Sep. 8, 2005).
125 Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, May 12, 2005, at 12,
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/sug-changes.htm (visited Aug. 9, 2005).
126 Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement Procedures Under Chapters 19 [unfair
trade disputes] and 20 [disputes among the Parties]  [hereinafter “NAFTA Code of Conduct”]  
available at  http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?CategoryId=75 (visited
Aug. 9, 2005).
127 WTO Appellate Body, “Rules of Conduct for the Understanding of Rules and
Procedures Concerning the Settlement of Investment Disputes,” Annex II to the Working
Procedures for Appellate Review (Jan. 4, 2005), available at
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The problem of actual and potential conflicts of interest arises wherever ad hoc arbitrators
are used.  Unless the appellate mechanism effectively becomes a permanent tribunal, the
members are all likely to be part-time.  When they are not engaged in work for the appellate
mechanism they are likely to be involved in their area of expertise, i.e., investment disputes,
either as arbitrators or counsel in investor-investor or investor-state disputes.  The potential for
conflicts is thus significant.
The ICSID Convention and Arbitral Rules encompass no code of conduct as such. 
Instead, Rule 6 provides a declaration by the arbitrators disclaiming any reasons for non-service
or lack of independence.124  Apparently because of some dissatisfaction with such a bare-bones
approach, the ICSID secretariat has proposed a requirement for a much broader disclosure
requirement designed to identify possible conflicts at the outset:
Attached is a statement of (a) my past and present professional, business
and other relationships (if any) with the parties is attached hereto and (b) any other
circumstance that might cause my reliability for independent judgment to be
questioned by a party. I acknowledge that by signing this declaration I assume a
continuing obligation promptly to notify the Secretary-General of the Centre of
any such relationship or circumstance that subsequently arises during this
proceeding.125
Because of the obvious sensitivity of the appellate mechanism process, particularly in the
earlier year, a stronger code of conduct would be appropriate, perhaps patterned after the NAFTA
Code of Conduct126 or the WTO DSU Rules.127  For example, the NAFTA Code of
Conduct(which is not applicable in Chapter 11 investment disputes but only to those arising
under other chapters) requires, inter alia, that
A candidate shall disclose any interest, relationship or matter that is likely to
-31-
128 NAFTA Code of Conduct, supra note 126, Part II(A, C) emphasis added.
129 WTO Code of Conduct, supra note 127, art. VI(2).
130 Id., annex 2, art. VI((5).
131 ICSID Convention, supra note 32, art. 66.
affect the candidate's independence or impartiality or that might reasonably
create an appearance of impropriety or an apprehension of bias in the
proceeding. To this end, a candidate shall make all reasonable efforts to become
aware of any such interests, relationships and matters. 
. . .
Once appointed, a member shall continue to make all reasonable efforts to
become aware of any interests, relationships or matters referred to in section A
and shall disclose them. The obligation to disclose is a continuing duty which
requires a member to disclose any such interests, relationships and matters that
may arise during any stage of the proceeding. 128
The WTO requires self-disclosure by panelists or members of the Appellate Body of “any
information that could reasonable be expected to be known to them at the time which, coming
within the governing principles of these rules, is likely to affect or give rise to justifiable doubts
as to their independence or impartiality.”129  The rules include “an illustrative list (Annex 2) of
examples of the matters subject to disclosure,” as well as a continuing obligation to “also
disclose any new information . . . .”130
G.  Situs
For efficiency and consistency reasons, a single multilaterally-supported appellate
mechanism, as contemplated in the Senate Report, would be preferable to separate bodies for
various agreements, if the volume is likely to be sufficient to justify such bureaucracy.   ICSID is
an obvious situs for a broadly based appellate mechanism, assuming that there is  a significant
number of ICSID Convention Parties who are interested in an alternative (or addition) to the
Annulment Committee.   Among other things, there is a highly competent ICSID secretariat.
Even if that staff were to require augmentation for such new responsibilities, this would be much
more cost-effective than starting from scratch.  Unfortunately, there does not seem to be much
support among ICSID Members for an investment appellate mechanism, either instead of or more
likely in addition to the Annulment Committee, as indicated by the Secretariat’s withdrawal of
the proposal, noted earlier.  (Those that likely most concerned– Canada and Mexico– are not
members of ICSID.)  
In some respects this may be just as well.   Because amendment of the ICSID Convention
requires unanimous approval of the now more than 140 members,131 it would be impractical to
incorporate the appellate mechanism as an amendment to the Convention.  Rather, as the ICSID
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Secretariat suggested, it would be preferable to have the earlier proposed “ICSID Appeals
Facilities Rules” approved by ICSID’s Administrative Council (as the Additional Facility Rules
were some years ago).132  If the Appeals Facilities Rules were drafted in a manner similar to the
Additional Facility [Arbitral] Rules, they would be largely procedural in nature.  Consent to the
use of the Appellate Facilities Rules, agreement to forego the use of the Annulment Committee,
and the substantive law rules to be applied, would presumably be determined by the underlying
bilateral investment treaties or FTA investment chapters,133 as the availability of the Additional
Facility Rules is determined.134  Another alternative might be to conclude a “plurilateral”
protocol to the ICSID Convention, rather than an amendment, which provided that as among the
parties to the protocol the Appellate Facilities Rules would be substituted for the Annulment
Committee.
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)– a group of
rich countries plus South Korea, Mexico and a few in Eastern Europe)135–  in some respects is
another logical home for a broadly-based  Appellate mechanism.  Presumably, an agreement
creating an appellate mechanism– entirely procedural in nature– would be  be easier to negotiate
than the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment.136  As such it could be made available to
non-OECD members, although some might be reluctant to participate in an instrument prepared
largely by capital-exporting nations, and the failure of the OECD’s efforts to conclude the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998 may make the OECD locus unattractive to others. 
Because there are  hundreds of BITs in force similar to the OECD model, between developed and
developing nations, this nexus might provide a rationale for non-OECD member accession. 
One commentator has suggested that the WTO’s Appellate Body might be given
jurisdiction over investment disputes as well as trade disputes.137  While attractive from an
efficiency point of view, this option has a number of disadvantages, including the fact that WTO
Appellate Body members are chosen for trade law rather than investment law expertise (although
a number of present and former members have investment law experience).  Most WTO
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Members, who have opposed a comprehensive WTO investment agreement as one of the
“Singapore Issues” in the Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations,138 would likely
strenuously oppose giving the WTO Appellate Body jurisdiction over investment disputes,
viewing it as an undesirable first step in expanding the WTO’s current very limited coverage of
investment issues139.  This reluctance seems likely even if the agreement creating an investment
appellate mechanism were a “plurilateral” agreement, with accession optional for the WTO
Members.
There are, of course, ad hoc alternatives, and this is undoubtedly the most practical
arrangement for an appellate mechanism that may have very few cases before it from year to
year, as the U.S. government apparently intends.140  One could, for example, envision an
appellate mechanism created by the seven CAFTA-DR parties, and then opened up to other
parties to U.S. FTAs containing investment provisions, or to BITs with similar provisions now
being negotiated by the United States.  If, for example, the NAFTA Parties were to decide to
amend NAFTA, Chapter 11 to include an appellate mechanism in lieu of court review in
Additional Facility and UNCITRAL cases– a political Pandora’s Box of considerable
dimension– they could graft on to the CAFTA-DR appellate mechanism.  Assuming that within a
few years the United States has treaty relationships (FTA or BIT) contemplating binding
investor-state arbitration with at least 50 nations141, such a limited appellate mechanism might be
reasonable in terms of efficiency, although probably less efficient cost-effective and politically
acceptable than an ICSID body.
One of the problems of an ad hoc appellate mechanism is the need for secretariat
services.  However, arrangements could likely be made with the ICSID Secretariat to conduct the
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CAFTA-DR appeals on a case-by-case basis, as has been done with a number of NAFTA
Chapter 11 cases brought under the UNCITRAL rules.142  This would effectively limit any
operational costs to the actual appeals filed, and important feature of the appellate mechanism
given the likely great reluctance among the CAFTA-DR member governments– including the
United States–  to funding an entity that may have no cases for a number of years.
Other convenient options are few.  There are of course many commercial arbitration sites,
such as the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris143, or the London Court of
Arbitration144, but neither are well-suited to disputes involving the United States and Central
American or the Dominican Republic governments compared to the use of the ICSID facilities in
Washington, D.C.  In theory, at least, the CAFTA-DR parties could call upon the facilities of the
Canadian or Mexican sections of the NAFTA Secretariat.  Those secretariats, designed to
manage NAFTA Chapter 19 and 20 cases,145 are generally under-utilized, particularly in Canada,
where no Chapter 19 or Chapter 20 cases are even pending.146  Canada, in particular, would
provide a reasonably well-staffed secretariat in a neutral country, probably at costs below those
charged by the ICSID Secretariat.147
H. Modifications to Existing BITs and FTAs
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Incorporating an appellate mechanism would require amendment of bilateral investment
treaties the investment provisions of NAFTA and other FTAs, as CAFTA-DR explicitly
contemplates.148 In most instances, changes in domestic law would also be required.149  Where an
investment treaty contemplates the use of ICSID arbitral rules, with exclusive resort to the ICSID
Annulment Committee,  modifications in ICSID party obligations would likely be required to
substitute an appellate mechanism for the Annulment Committee.  The amendment of BITs
would be easier politically than amending investment provisions of NAFTA and FTAs, since it
could be difficult, if reopening NAFTA or FTAs, to limit the modifications to inclusion of an
appellate mechanism, but given the need for Senate advice and consent to protocols to existing
BITs, the process could take years to implement, unless the legislation creating one or more
appellate mechanisms could be included with other, important but less controversial trade or
trade-related legislation.
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
Overall, the appellate mechanism concept seems to be more generally favored by some
states, including the United States, than by private investors and their counsel, although there are
indications that with the right structure an appellate mechanism would be preferred over
substantial delays at ICSID or review by multiple national courts.150  This is not surprising, given
that historically, most (but not all) of the requests for court or ICSID Annulment Committee
review are brought be respondent states, not by investors.  Also, there appears to be some
concern among states that are already reassessing the desirability of BITs that the existence of an
ICSID (or some other) appellate facility would effectively pressure states concluding BITs to
include the facility in new agreements.
In the author’s view, the investment appellate mechanism is a proposal which, if it can be
properly implemented, could be beneficial to both governments and the investment community.
A well-structured and staffed appellate mechanism could improve the jurisprudence in
investment-related arbitration by increasing consistency and annulling the occasional wrong
decision. A CAFTA-DR mechanism, in particular, would provide some modest increase in
consistency over the current national court process.  There, one can be reasonably sure that one of
several U.S. roster members would sit on most or all of the cases, regardless of whether a U.S.
investor was seeking compensation from one of the other CAFTA-DR governments (the most
likely scenario) or vice-versa.  As such, the appellate mechanism could allay some of the fears of
investment agreement critics without detracting from the generally high level of investor
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protection in NAFTA, the recent FTAs and BITs, assuming of course– and this is a major
assumption– that those critics were supportive of the 2-3 persons selected for the American
roster. 
An investment appellate mechanism is not, however, a cure-all for all or even most of the
problems (real or apparent) that emerge in investor-state arbitration. Even if, as hoped, the
appellate mechanism would substitute a single appellate step for what today may be multiple
levels of court proceedings when arbitral decisions are reviewed by national courts, it probably
would not significantly reduce expenses, particularly if the appellate mechanism has the authority
to review key facts on a de novo basis.  Nor it would satisfy those groups that are broadly
opposed to NAFTA Chapter 11 and similar mechanisms in BITs and FTAs,151 nor assure that
governments unhappy with decisions against them would receive relief.
Moreover, putting the idea into practice is fraught with practical and legal problems, and
the potential for enormous political controversy, even if the scope of review is limited largely to
legal issues in a manner that gives considerable deference to the determinations of arbitral
tribunals.  Those with significant interest in the creation and operation of an investment appellate
mechanism– nations, foreign investors, and NGOs, among others– will not likely see eye to eye
on the major structural and procedural issues.  No mechanism satisfactory to the foreign
investment community is likely to be fully acceptable to governments in their defendant roles, or
to environmental and other NGOs, particularly with regard to standard of review, posting of
bonds, eliminating the role of national courts, and choice of roster members. 
CAFTA-DR is the likely laboratory for an initial effort to create appellate mechanism,
once the agreement goes into effect January 1, 2006.  Whether it is realistic for the CAFTA-DR
nations to conclude negotiations regarding such a novel concept within one year remains to be
seen.  Nor can those in the U.S. Congress who supported the concept of an appellate mechanism
in the Trade Promotion Authority legislation in 2002, but opposed CAFTA-DR in 2005, be
expected to support an amendment to CAFTA-DR to establish an appellate mechanism.  It would
also be unreasonable to assume that the Bush Administration, having won CAFTA-DR in the
House of Representatives only by putting the full prestige of the presidency (and some “carrots”)
behind it152, would have any strong interest in proposing a CAFTA-DR amendment to Congress,
for an appellate mechanism or any other purpose.  Thus, under the best of circumstances– prompt
agreement on an appellate mechanism by the CAFTA-DR  Parties in the mandated negotiations–
it could be some years (if at all) before the CAFTA-DR is amended, and even longer before the
first case reaches the appellate mechanism.
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Notwithstanding these very substantial political challenges in the United States, and legal
drafting and negotiating complexities, CAFTA-DR does have several advantages as a “guinea
pig”:  there will be seven nation parties (eventually), rather than only two as in most other FTAs
or three in NAFTA.  All seven CAFTA-DR Parties are already parties to ICSID (unlike Canada
and Mexico), which will allow flexibility in designating ICSID as the ad hoc secretariat or even
ultimately as the seat of a broader appellate facility.  Having accepted the existing investment
provisions in CAFTA-DR, none of the other six Parties are likely to have significant opposition
to an appellate mechanism, as it should have modest cost advantages (at least over a multiple
level situs court review process) and lead to greater predictability than national courts.  Since
several CAFTA-DR Parties– Costa Rica and Nicaragua in particular– have a history of
expropriation or other adverse actions against American investors153, it is reasonable to predict
that an appellate mechanism applicable to investment disputes under CAFTA-DR will eventually
be utilized if it ever becomes operational.  There will be cases, although probably not many.  A
well-structured investment appellate mechanism negotiated in the CAFTA-DR context should
also serve as the model for broader applicability of the concept. Is an appellate mechanism really
worth all the effort, up to now and in the future, to the governments, the investment communities
and civil society?  
Is it really cost-effective in the broadest sense to create an investment appellate
mechanism when the benefits over the existing system (ICSID Annulment Committee for ICSID
arbitrations, national courts for the rest) – primarily a modest increase in the likelihood of
consistency and the elimination of multi-layer appeals in the national court systems– are so
limited?  Certainly, in retrospect, there is serious doubt.  However, the process has by now gained
sufficient momentum to be likely to continue through at least a good faith attempt at the drafting
of a CAFTA-DR amendment.  However, for adoption and implementation,  don’t hold your
breath!
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